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Abstract 
This paper explores how an organization can 
utilize its employees to combat phishing attacks 
collectively through coordinating their activities to 
create a human firewall. We utilize knowledge 
management research on knowledge sharing to guide 
the design of an experiment that explores a central 
reporting and dissemination platform for phishing 
attacks. The 2x2 experiment tests the effects of public 
attribution (to the first person reporting a phishing 
message) and validation (by the security team) of 
phishing messages on reporting motivation and 
accuracy. Results demonstrate that knowledge 
management techniques are transferable to 
organizational security and that knowledge 
management can benefit from insights gained from 
combating phishing. Specifically, we highlight the 
need to both publicly acknowledge the contribution to 
a knowledge management system and provide 
validation of the contribution. As we saw in our 
experiment, doing only one or the other does not 
improve outcomes for correct phishing reports (hits). 
 
  
1. Introduction  
 
Employees all world over receive them: messages 
that tempt us to click on a link to address emergencies 
such as preserving our email accounts from deletion or 
viewing a critical security notification. Some phishing 
messages are easy to spot, but many deceive even the 
most skilled computer users [1]. Organizations of all 
types (commercial, governmental, and nonprofit) are 
under constant threat from others who wish to steal 
private information. Increasingly the most dangerous 
threat for a data breach comes from phishing attacks 
through legitimate channels of electronic 
communication such as email [2]. The damages from 
these attacks, which include fraud, theft, damage to 
reputation, regulatory violations, and loss of 
intellectual property [3], have been estimated to 
exceed $2.3 billion USD annually according to the FBI 
[4]. Gone are the days when organizations might 
successfully avoid attack by keeping a low profile and 
maintaining firewalls and servers. The issue facing 
most organizations is no longer if, but when a phishing 
attack will reach organization members. 
Research so far has examined how individuals can 
avoid these attacks through implementing training and 
security policies [e.g., 5] and SANS institute labeled 
this initiative as the ‘human being firewall’ [6]. 
Results from these studies point to a reduction in 
phishing vulnerability with training and security 
policies. However, research also suggested that even 
with training, a few people when left alone still 
struggle with identifying phishing attacks [e.g., 7]. For 
a phishing attack to be successful, often all that is 
required is for a single person in a targeted group to 
respond. 
This research investigates a different approach in 
which individuals work together, rather than in 
isolation as suggested by the SANS institute initiative 
[6], to create an interconnected “human firewall”. 
Individuals acting together directly addresses the 
problem of the weakest link by which phishers often 
achieve success. With organization members acting in 
a coordinated fashion and sharing knowledge about 
attacks, an individual need not face phishing attacks 
alone, but can be informed and protected by other 
organization members.  
The creation of the human firewall builds on 
previous research that shows people can recognize 
phishing attacks quickly when acting as a group [8]. 
However, how identification and dissemination can be 
facilitated by technology is an unexplored issue that 
needs to be resolved if organizations can make use of 
a human firewall. Therefore, we draw upon strategies 
from knowledge sharing and information security 
[e.g., 9] to guide our investigation. By blending these 
two perspectives in novel ways, our hope is to improve 
coordination between organization members as they 
face evolving phishing attacks.    
In this research, we answer the following research 
question: How can organizations leverage knowledge 
sharing technologies and extrinsic motivation to 
facilitate the human firewall by sustaining 
organization members’ motivation to contribute, 
increasing correct identification of phishing 
messages, and reducing incorrect identification of 
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 phishing messages? To answer our research question, 
we draw on theory from knowledge management and 
crowdsourcing to guide our hypotheses. We carried 
out a 2 x 2 experiment that crossed attribution (to the 
first person reporting a phishing message) and 
validation by the security team of phishing messages 
received by organization members. In answering this 
research question with our experiment, this research 
makes the following contributions: First, we test the 
feasibility of shifting the focus of anti-phishing efforts 
from individuals to groups of individuals and 
potentially whole organizations. Second, our research 
tests technology-based, organizational interventions 
(e.g., attribution and validation) that managers may 
consider to facilitate individuals working together to 
counter phishing attacks.  
 
2. Background Literature  
 
2.1. Vulnerability to Phishing Attacks 
 
Phishing is “a form of social engineering in which 
an attacker, also known as a ‘phisher’, attempts to 
fraudulently retrieve legitimate users’ confidential or 
sensitive credentials by mimicking electronic 
communications from a trustworthy or public 
organization in an automated fashion” [10, p.1].  The 
Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) reported that 
they observed more phishing attacks in the first quarter 
of 2016 than in any other three month period since 
2004 when they started collecting data. In addition, 
APWG reported the number of unique phishing 
websites detected increased 250 percent between 
October 2015 and March 2016 [11]. Ponemom 
Institute estimates annual cost of a successful phishing 
attack per company to be $3.7 million while about 
48% of this cost relates to costs from loss of employee 
productivity [12]. Spear phishing attacks that have 
been successful at companies and institutions such as 
Target, Sony, and even the Pentagon and White 
House, cost on average around $1.8 million per 
incident [13]. Despite the tremendous rate of growth, 
Vishwanath and colleagues [14] point out that the 
prevalence of phishing attacks diminish consumer 
confidence and trust in online commerce and 
communication, resulting in increased operational 
costs for online retailers. Thus, research that focuses 
on how to combat these types of attacks is a top 
priority not only for researchers but also for IT 
practitioners.  
 
2.2 Gathering Phishing Knowledge  
 
Researchers have been studying what motivates 
employees to submit knowledge to a central repository 
for decades. Most of this research has come through 
investigation of knowledge management systems 
(KMSs) because without new inflow of knowledge a 
KMS cannot deliver value [15]. This is especially true 
for KMSs that support a fast changing environment, 
such as tracking phishing attacks. There are two 
required steps to getting high-quality knowledge into 
a KMS: (1) knowledge must be contributed by the 
members of the community that utilize this 
knowledge; and (2) the contributed knowledge must 
be validated to ensure accuracy [16]. Regarding the 
contribution by organizational members, research 
found that the following factors play a role: intrinsic 
and extrinsic motivation [e.g., 17], attitude toward 
knowledge sharing, subjective norm of knowledge 
sharing [e.g., 18], individual motivations, structural 
capital, cognitive capital, and relational capital [19]. 
The second step, validation, must be carefully 
designed because if even highly motivated employees 
perceive the validation process to be too strict or non-
transparent, they will stop submitting knowledge [20] 
because rejection may lead to embarrassment [21] or 
could be perceived to be very costly [18].  
 Based on the above, we decided to focus on an 
important motivational factor – extrinsic motivation 
[e.g., 22]. Specifically, we focus on attribution of the 
contribution of potential phishing messages to the first 
person who reported it. We also incorporated a 
transparent validation process that provided timely 
feedback and did not reject any submissions [20] so as 
to encourage reporting of potential phishing attacks 
[18].  
 
2.3 Accuracy of Reporting Phishing  
 
The determination of phishing/non-phishing is a 
binary identification task for which accuracy can 
easily be measured in terms of hits and false positives. 
In phishing identification, hits occur when individuals 
correctly classify actual phishing messages as 
phishing. False positives occur when individuals 
classify legitimate messages as phishing messages. 
From these two measurements, the other potential 
outcomes of identification tasks can be easily 
calculated (e.g., false negative, correct rejection).     
Past theorizing regarding identification tasks [e.g., 
23] has suggested that there are two primary 
mechanisms available to individuals who wish to 
improve accuracy in identification tasks. The first 
mechanism is to properly set thresholds that 
individuals use in their identification tasks. While 
deciding whether or not a message is phishing, an 
individual may observe several characteristics and if a 
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 combination of these characteristics exceeds 
thresholds, the individual will classify the message as 
phishing. For example, an individual could examine 
such characteristics as source familiarity, language 
that induces time pressure, and inclusion of a 
suspicious link. If the presence or amount of these 
characteristics exceeds a combination of thresholds 
determined by the individual, then the message would 
be classified as phishing. Careful placement of the 
thresholds will improve accuracy, especially if biases 
or habit may cloud the identification task.   
The second way to improve accuracy is to increase 
the number of diagnostic characteristics that may be 
useful in the identification task. For example, if the 
individuals may learn that a request for private 
information is a highly suspicious request. Therefore, 
individuals may incorporate the type of request as a 
useful characteristic to which they should pay 
attention.  
The object of most training programs designed to 
improve individuals’ accuracy in identification tasks is 
improving the placement of thresholds and 
introducing new, diagnostic characteristics that should 
be considered during identification. However, in order 
for individuals to gauge their performance and 
internalize lessons, some kind of validation is 
necessary. When validation is provided, individuals 
have the opportunity to adjust the characteristics they 
attend to and the threshold they apply to them. In the 
phishing context, validation is provided through 
validation as the ground truth regarding a particular 
message is uncovered and reported.   
 
3. Hypotheses Development 
 
When organizations publically acknowledge 
contributions from organizational members, they will 
be incentivized to report more messages to gain public 
recognition through their interaction with the KMS 
[24]. Attribution, a type of extrinsic reward [22], 
communicates to the individual that the organization 
values their contribution and assigns personal credit. 
Public attribution is a way to build reputation [19, 25] 
and is evidence of expertise [26]. As a result, when 
individuals feel that knowledge sharing can elevate 
their reputation, they will be more inclined to submit 
potential phishing attacks to the KMS [e.g., 19]. 
 
H1: Public attribution of contribution will increase 
self-reported motivation to report suspicious 
messages. 
 
With greater motivation to contribute, individuals will 
be likely to be more sensitized to the potential for 
phishing messages. In other words, the thresholds that 
individuals use to identify a phishing message may be 
lowered. The lowered thresholds could result in an 
increase in the number of hits individuals achieve, but 
would likely come at a cost of an increased number of 
false positives.   
 
H2: Public attribution of contribution will increase the 
number of suspicious emails that are falsely reported 
as phishing (false positives).  
 
H3: Public attribution will increase the number of 
correctly reported phishing messages (hits).  
 
Validation of the reported potential phishing 
attacks serves two purposes that may increase the 
number of hits and decrease the number of false 
alarms. First, when others (e.g., IT Security 
department) review the reported messages and provide 
validation, individuals will realize that their 
contributions are being evaluated for correctness. 
They will become more motivated to carefully process 
messages they report [e.g., 20]. Second, validation 
may offer individuals the ability to improve their own 
decision making as they have a chance to adjust their 
thresholds and the characteristics they consider. 
Additionally, when validation is made public, 
individuals have the chance to not only learn from 
their own experience reporting messages as 
suspicious, but they also have the benefit of observing 
and learning from the validation results of others. 
Therefore, public validation supports observational 
and experiential learning, which should lead to an 
increase in the number of hits and a decrease in the 
number of false positives. 
 
H4: Public validation will interact with public 
attribution such that a) false positives will decrease 
and b) hits will increase when they are combined.  
 
4. Method  
 
To test our hypotheses, we conducted a 2 x 2 
experiment, crossing attribution (present or absent) 
and validation (present or absent). The experiment 
included two parts. The first was a pre-survey that 
participants completed several days prior to coming to 
the lab. The pre-survey contained questions about the 
covariates and permitted participants to schedule a lab 
session. The second part was a 40-minute lab session 
during which participants were asked to assume the 
role of an intern to a senior vice president (SVP) of a 
software company. Upon arriving at the experiment, 
participants were consented and then were introduced 
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 to their tasks. Participants were also given a list of 
employees and personal contacts for the SVP and each 
participant was instructed to help manage the SVP’s 
inbox. Participants responded to messages from other 
executives, scheduled meetings for the SVP, and 
forwarded personal to the SVP’s personal account. In 
addition participants were instructed to help plan a 
future product marketing event by finding three 
different hotels in a remote city that have sufficient 
capacity to handle the event. The messages in each 
inbox and all work tasks were the same for all 
participants. These work tasks were meant simulate 
the multiple organizational priorities (in addition to 
information security) that employees must manage. 
In addition to their work tasks, participants were 
asked to read an organizational security policy, which 
required them to report phishing messages by 
forwarding them to the IT security department. 
Participants were instructed that completing the work 
tasks was a higher priority than reporting suspicious 
messages.  
When participants opened the inbox, there were 8 
emails waiting to be processed, one of which was a 
phishing message. An additional 18 emails were sent 
to participants including four additional phishing 
messages. Phishing emails were modeled after actual 
malicious messages [27] and mimicked an IT-service 
desk request, a cloud storage share request, a deal from 
a hotel chain, a payment receipt, and a security alert. 
All phishing emails contained links to a website 
owned by the experimenters. If participants clicked on 
a link in a phishing email, they were first directed to a 
webpage in our website (where their machines could 
have been compromised if the phishing attack were 
real) and then were immediately redirected to a 
legitimate website. Participants had a total of 30 
minutes to process all 26 messages, after which they 
were directed to a post-survey where they completed 
items concerning motivation. Finally, participants 
were asked not to share details of the experiment with 
others and were dismissed. 
 
4. 1. Participants 
 
Students from an introductory MIS class at a 
large U.S. mid-western university were recruited for 
the experiment and were offered extra credit for their 
participation. A total of 120 students completed the 
pre-survey however, 16 students did not complete the 
lab session and were excluded from the study. 
Therefore a total of 104 completed the experiment by 
attending the lab session. Participants who completed 
the experiment reported a mean age of 20.6 (max: 33, 
min: 18) and of all participants, 72.1 percent were 
male. Students were a good population for this 
experiment because a majority of them would shortly 
join the workforce as interns and would use email 
during their work. Additionally, students are a 
frequent target of phishing attacks. 33.7 percent of 
participants reported knowing someone who had 
fallen for a phishing message and 34.6 percent of 
participants reported nearly falling for a phishing 
message themselves.  
 
4.2. Independent, Dependent, and Covariate 
Variables 
4.2.1. Independent Variables. The security policy 
provided to the participants described the experiment 
manipulations and introduced a message board, acting 
as a KMS, that all participants in a session could see. 
The message board, displayed the following 
information about messages that were reported to IT 
security: (1) subject of the message; (2) number of 
people who reported the message; (3) first participant 
to report the message (in the condition where 
attribution was present); (4) validation status – “under 
review,” “confirmed phishing,” “confirmed spam,” 
“non-malicious” (in the condition where validation 
was present). In the validation condition, messages 
that were reported were initially labeled as under 
review. Ninety seconds after the email was reported, 
the status changed to the either confirmed phishing, 
confirmed spam, or non-malicious. To ensure all 
participants understood the purpose and function of 
the message board, during the introduction of the 
experiment an experimenter would present the 
message board, describe all of its components, and 
answer any questions participants had. An example 
message board with all four components is shown in 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Screenshot of message board with all 
conditions shown.  
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 4.2.2. Dependent Variables. The study addressed 
three dependent variables. The first is self-reported 
motivation to report phishing messages. This scale 
included three items: “I tried hard to identify phishing 
messages during the task,” “I was motivated to report 
phishing messages,” and “Reporting phishing 
messages was important to me.”  
The second and third dependent variables 
captured the hits and false positives from participants 
as they reported suspicious messages. If a participant 
reported a phishing message it, was recorded as a hit. 
If a participant reported a spam message or non-
malicious message, it was recorded as a false positive. 
Repeated reports of phishing and non-phishing 
messages by the same participant were ignored. 
Therefore the maximum number of hits a participant 
could have was five and the maximum number of false 
positives a participant could have was 21.   
 
4.2.3. Covariates. Past research has demonstrated 
other factors that influence individuals’ recognition of 
and resistance to phishing messages [7, 28]. Therefore, 
we captured propensity to trust [29], perceived 
Internet risk [30, 31], internal and external computer 
self-efficacy [32], and self-reported expertise in 
identifying phishing messages as these variables have 
been examined in recent phishing research [e.g., 7].    
 
5. Data Analysis and Results 
 
Using Mplus 7.1 [33], a measurement model was 
estimated to determine reliability, discriminant 
validity, convergent validity, and calculate latent 
factor scores for self-reported measures. The fit 
statistics for the measurement model were CFI = 
0.951, TLI = 0.940, RMSEA was 0.056 with a 90% 
confidence interval of 0.034-0.075. All of these fit 
statistics provide evidence of convergent validity [34]. 
Further, construct cross-loadings were analyzed to 
provide evidence of discriminant validity. All of the 
loadings of each item on its latent construct exceeded 
0.6. Average variance extracted for all constructs was 
much larger than 0.5; therefore good convergent 
validity was demonstrated [35], and all square roots of 
average variance extracted exceeded the correlation 
coefficients between construct and therefore 
demonstrated good discriminant validity [36].  
The analysis plan consisted of 3 different Analyses 
of Covariance (ANCOVAs). In each ANCOVA, the 
latent factor scores were used to estimate perceptual 
measures. Further, attribution and validation served as 
the independent variables and propensity to trust, 
Internet risk, internal computer self-efficacy, external 
self-efficacy, and expertise in identifying phishing 
served as covariates. In the first ANCOVA, motivation 
served as the dependent variable. In the second, 
number of hits served as the dependent variable. In the 
third, number of false positive served as the dependent 
variable. The means and standard deviations for 
motivation, hits, and false positives for all 
experimental conditions are shown in Table 1.  
Consistent with H1, the first ANCOVA revealed a 
significant effect of attribution on motivation, F(1, 95) 
= 5.210, p = .003, ηp2 = .09. However, the second 
ANCOVA did not reveal a significant effect of 
attribution on hits, F(1, 95) = .095, p = .759, and the 
third ANCOVA did not reveal a significant effect of 
attribution on false positives, F(1, 95) = 2.307, p = 
.132. These finding fail to confirm H2 and H3.  
 
Table 1. Means of dependent variables by condition 
Condition N Mean 
Motivation 
(SD) 
Mean 
Hits 
(SD) 
Mean 
False 
Positives 
(SD) 
No 
Attribution,  
No 
Validation 
25 -.210  
(.848) 
3.480  
(1.123) 
2.120  
(1.943) 
Attribution,  
No 
Validation 
30 .148  
(.599) 
2.533  
(1.525) 
2.300  
(1.705) 
No 
Attribution, 
Validation 
25 -.255  
(1.064) 
2.680  
(1.887) 
2.040  
(2.131) 
Attribution, 
Validation 
24 .299  
(.407) 
3.542  
(1.414) 
2.958  
(1.517) 
 
In the first ANCOVA, external computer self- 
efficacy exerted a significant influence on motivation, 
F(1, 95) = 3.594, p = .014, ηp2 = .06. But all other 
covariates were insignificant.  
In the second ANCOVA, internal computer self-
efficacy exerted a significant influence on hits, F(1, 
95) = 4.426, p = .038, ηp2 = .05, and the influence of 
external computer self-efficacy approached 
significance, F(1, 95) = 3.172, p = .078, ηp2 = .03. All 
other covariates were insignificant.  
In the third ANCOVA, all of the covariates were 
insignificant.  
To test the H4, we examined the interaction 
coefficient for attribution and valuation in the second 
and third ANCOVAs. The influence of the interaction 
coefficient on false positives was insignificant in the 
third ANCOVA, F(1, 95) = 1.215, p = .273. However, 
the influence of the interaction coefficient on hits was 
significant, F(1, 95) = 8.027, p = .006, ηp2 = .08. The 
interaction is shown in Figure 2.  
Simple pairwise comparisons show that 
participants using a message board without attribution 
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 and validation had more hits than those in the 
attribution-only and validation-only conditions (see 
Table 1 for means). Likewise, participants in the 
attribution and validation condition had more hits in 
than the attribution-only and validation-only 
conditions. Interestingly, participants using a message 
board with neither attribution nor validation had a 
similar number of hits as participants with both. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Interaction of attribution and validation 
on number of hits 
 
5.1. Supplemental Analysis 
 
To explore further the effects of attribution and 
validation, we examined their effects on the level of 
participation (whether or not participants reported any 
emails as suspicious) and the raw counts of messages 
that were reported as suspicious (taking into account 
duplicate reports).  
To examine participation, we conducted a logistic 
regression with whether or not each participant 
reported a message as suspicious as the dependent 
variable and attribution and validation as independent 
variables. All of the covariates were also included. 
Results showed that 100 out of the 104 participants 
participated by reporting at least a single message as 
suspicious. Not surprisingly, neither attribution (B = -
19.40, p = .998) nor validation (B = -17.84, p = .998) 
produced a significant effect on participation. None of 
the covariates were significant either. 
To examine the raw number of reports, we 
conducted an additional ANCOVA with attribution 
and validation as independent variables. We also 
include the covariates in the analysis. Results revealed 
no significant main effects or significant covariates. 
However, the interaction between attribution and 
validation was significant, F(1, 95) = 4.972, p = .028, 
ηp2 = .05. The interaction followed a similar pattern to 
the interaction pattern produced in the ANCOVA for 
hits. Simple comparison tests revealed that 
participants in the condition with both attribution and 
validation reported more messages as suspicious as 
those in the attribution-only condition and those in the 
validation-only condition. However, there was no 
difference between participants with both attribution 
and validation and participants with neither. The 
interaction is illustrated in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3. Interaction of attribution and validation 
on total messages reported 
 
Finally, to determine if conditions of the 
message board were disruptive to work tasks, we 
conducted additional analysis on the number of 
messages the participants sent to co-workers and the 
number of meetings scheduled as part of their work 
tasks. We did not find significant differences in the 
number of messages the participants sent due to 
attribution, F(1, 95) = .027, p = .869, or due to 
validation, F(1, 95) = 1.015, p = .316. Similarly, we 
did not find significant differences in the number of 
meetings participants scheduled due to validation, F(1, 
95) = .001, p = .982. However, the effect from 
attribution approached significance, F(1, 95) = 2.905, 
p = .092, ηp2 = .03, and the attribution x validation 
interaction was significant, F(1, 95) = 3.894, p = .051, 
ηp2 = .04. The interaction is illustrated in Figure 4. 
Simple comparisons demonstrated that those in the 
attribution, validation condition scheduled 
significantly more meetings than those in the no 
attribution, validation condition.  
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 6. Discussion  
 
Before discussing the implications of our findings 
for research and practice, we raise several limitations 
of this study. First, our study is subject to many of the 
limitations common to experimental research. The 
participants were not actually employed by an 
organization and were playing a role. Although the 
role would have been familiar to participants, they 
were not subject to many of the organizational 
pressures that actual interns would face. These 
limitations permitted assignment to conditions and 
enabled experimental control. 
 
Figure 4. Interaction of attribution and validation 
on number of meetings scheduled 
 
 
Second, we anticipate that the results of this study 
generalize to the college-aged student population. 
However, additional work is necessary to determine if 
these results will generalize to a more diverse sample 
of working adults. 
Third, our focus was on regular phishing attack and 
not spear phishing attacks that are more successful. In 
our study, the success of these regular phishing attacks 
was 25%, which means that out of 5 phishing emails 
subjects fell for at least one. Future research should 
also focus on spear phishing attacks.  
With these limitations in mind, there are several 
important implications of this study. 
  
6.1 Implications for Research 
 
We have several key findings for both knowledge 
sharing and security. First, we found that attribution 
within our message board does positively affect 
motivation to report phishing messages. Past research 
on contribution to KMSs states that “individuals must 
think that their contribution to others will be worth the 
effort and that some new value will be created” [37 pg. 
36]. Further, the literature states that personal 
acknowledge and personal benefits do indeed increase 
motivation to contribute [38].  Our study provides a 
message board that shows contribution activity, so you 
can see the collective group participating in real time. 
This alone creates motivation for participants to report 
phishing messages.  
We did find that the conditions which produced 
the best hit rates (e.g., identifying of phishing 
messages) were either no attribution and validation or 
both attribution and validation. Attribution or 
validation alone were the least likely elicit hits.  
Bock et al. [39] argue that several factors drive 
attitudes towards knowledge sharing. These include: 
(1) anticipated rewards, (2) anticipated reciprocity and 
(3) self-worth. Bock describes self-worth as an 
employee getting feedback on their contribution will 
develop a favorable attitude towards contribution.  We 
also know that individuals working on a collective task 
feel they are central to the effort are more likely to 
sustain their contribution [40]. Taken together and as 
also supported by the results of our experiment, you 
need to acknowledge the contribution both publically 
and provide validation on the contribution [41]. In 
addition, as we saw in our experiment, doing only one 
or the other does not improve outcomes. Interestingly, 
previous research showed that attribution and 
validation are peripheral cues that are more important 
on knowledge filtering decisions than is the content of 
a knowledge submission [41]. Our research shows that 
attribution and validation are also important for 
knowledge submission. This is an interesting finding 
because it shows that the interaction between 
attribution and validation influences both knowledge 
reuse and knowledge sharing, two processes that were 
deemed by the literature to have completely different 
antecedents. Future studies need to evaluate whether 
these two factors apply to all kinds of knowledge (e.g., 
elaborate documents, short explanations of what to do 
next) and whether they apply in different knowledge 
domains (e.g., security, project management, 
computer help-desk).  
We also found that attribution for phishing 
reporting created spillover to other non-related tasks. 
Specifically, we found that once activated by 
attribution, participants increased the completion of 
work-related tasks. That said, the effect of attribution 
and validation did not spill over to identifying the 
other work related tasks. This spillover was an 
unexpected benefit of the public message board that 
warrants additional investigation.       
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 In conclusion, our lab experiment in which we 
developed a leaderboard-like system to track phishing 
messages that functioned as a knowledge management 
system that supported the human firewall not only 
contributes to the security literature that studies how 
to combat phishing attacks but also to the knowledge 
sharing literature.  
 
6.2 Implications for Practice  
 
Clearly, there are effective alternatives to 
incentivize contributions to centralized anti-phishing 
efforts. This work provides evidence for this. 
Organizations must take note that providing a message 
might add value, but alone it is not optimal. Further, 
organizations must understand the implications of 
adding certain design features that are guided by 
current research in knowledge sharing [16-20] and 
knowledge reuse [41], such as attribution of shared 
knowledge to the author and validation of such 
knowledge.  
Second, motivation alone does not improve the 
security of your organizations. Many past studies have 
argued that motivation and fear appeals are the 
linchpins to improved IT security [42, 43]. We found 
manipulations that increase one's motivation, but they 
did not necessarily improve the phishing message hits 
or even the false positives. Organizations need to be 
aware that solutions that may, at face, increase the 
motivation of your workforce to report vulnerabilities, 
may not mitigate the vulnerabilities.   
 
7. Conclusion  
  
This preliminary study examines whether certain 
design elements in a knowledge management system 
(e.g., message board) are transferable to support the 
human firewall where individuals work together, 
rather than in isolation, to combat phishing attacks. 
We found that attribution of the contribution increases 
motivation to contribute, but not the overall quality of 
the contribution. The optimal design in our study was 
attribution and validation of the contribution or a plain 
message board with neither of these design elements.  
This research was supported by a grant from the 
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Appendix A - Measurement Model 
 AVE C.R. 1 2 
1 - RISK 0.53 0.82 0.73  
2 - TRUST 0.70 0.91 0.14 0.84 
3 - PHEXP 0.65 0.88 0.04 -0.03 
4 - CSE_INT 0.61 0.82 0.06 0.15 
5 - CSE_EX 0.64 0.84 -0.10 0.18 
6 - MOTIV 0.77 0.91 -0.04 -0.03 
 3 4 5 6 
1 - RISK     
2 - TRUST     
3 - PHEXP 0.81    
4 - CSE_INT 0.39 0.78   
5 - CSE_EX 0.20 0.32 0.80  
6 - MOTIV 0.08 0.02 0.23 0.88 
 
Table A2. Loadings 
Construct Items Loadings 
RISK RISK1 0.759 
 RISK2 0.681 
 RISK3 0.766 
 RISK4 0.710 
TRUST TRUST1 0.860 
 TRUST2 0.823 
 TRUST3 0.846 
 TRUST4 0.825 
PHEXP IDPHISH1 0.872 
 IDPHISH2 0.967 
 IDPHISH3 0.655 
 IDPHISH4 0.687 
CSE_INT CSE_INT1 0.854 
 CSE_INT2 0.787 
 CSE_INT3 0.689 
CSE_EXT CSE_EX1 0.675 
 CSE_EX2 0.982 
 CSE_EX3 0.698 
MOTIVATION MOTIV_1 0.779 
 MOTIV_2 0.962 
 MOTIV_3 0.875 
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